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Florida's "Stand Your Ground" Law:
The Actual Effects and the
Need for Clarification
ZACHARY L. WEAVERt
INTRODUCTION
Florida's "Stand Your Ground" Law has been controversial' since
Governor Jeb Bush signed it into law on April 26, 2005.2 The Protection
of Persons/Use of Force Bill (the Judiciary Committee's Committee
Substitute for Senate Bill 436)3 expanded an individual's legal right to
use force in self-defense, including deadly force,4 without fear of crimi-
nal or civil consequences.5 In doing so, the law abrogated "the common
law duty to retreat when attacked before using force, including deadly
force in self-defense or defense of others. ' 6 Although it should have
t J.D. Candidate 2009, University of Miami School of Law. B.A. 2006, Clemson
University. Thank you to Professor Mario Barnes for guidance and input and Kate Weaver for
editing.
1. Recent Developments, Florida Legislation-The Controversy Over Florida's New "Stand
Your Ground" Law-FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2005), 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 351, 351-53 (2005)
("While several bills taken up for discussion during the 2005 Florida legislative session were
controversial, the Judiciary Committee's Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 436 is, perhaps, at
the top of the list .... [T]he battle over what is commonly referred to as Florida's 'stand your
ground' bill, figuratively speaking, had many Floridians up in arms, debating the changes the
proposed law would bring.").
2. 2005 Fla. Laws 199, 202.
3. See id. at 201 (using the terminology "[ulse of force in defense of person" to describe the
law).
4. "Deadly force" is defined, in part, by section 776.06(1) of the Florida Statutes as "force
that is likely to cause death or great bodily harm." FLA. STAT. § 776.06(1) (2007). The Fourth
District Court of Appeal of Florida defined "deadly force" as whenever "the natural, probable, and
foreseeable consequences of the defendant's acts are death." Garramone v. State, 636 So. 2d 869,
871 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). In 1993, the Third District Court of Appeal of Florida held that the
discharge of a firearm constitutes deadly force because "[a] firearm is, by definition, a deadly
weapon." Miller v. State, 613 So. 2d 530, 53! (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
5. See 2005 Fla. Laws 202 ("A person who uses force as permitted ... is immune from
criminal prosecution and civil action for the use of such force.").
6. STAFF OF FLA. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC
IMPACT STATEMENT ON CS/CS/SB 436 (Reg. Sess. 2005), available at http://www.flsenate.gov/
data/session/2005/Senate/bills/analysis/pdf/2005s0436.ju.pdf. The Florida common law duty to
retreat required that, prior to using deadly force, a person outside his or her home or place of work
must use every reasonable means available to avoid the danger (including retreating). See State v.
James, 867 So. 2d 414,416 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) ("[T]here is still a Florida common law duty
to use every reasonable means to avoid the danger, including retreat, prior to using deadly
force."). The common law duty to retreat placed emphasis on the sanctity of life by promoting the
policy that "[h]uman life is precious, and deadly combat should be avoided if at all possible when
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troubled the legislature that the individuals charged with enforcing the
law-prosecutors and law enforcement-opposed the law,7 the dissent
by these groups did not dissuade the Florida Legislature. The law passed
with unanimous approval in the Florida Senate and passed overwhelm-
ingly in the Florida House of Representatives. 8
Vehement arguments both for and against the law have been
advanced during and since its passage. Proponents of the legislation,
backed by the weighty support of the National Rifle Association
("NRA"), 9 claim that the law was necessary to give law-abiding citizens
the ability to protect themselves.' ° The NRA's self-interest-sanction-
ing the use of deadly force in more circumstances and thereby sanction-
ing the use of firearms in those situations-and heavy involvement in
creating and passing the legislation did not deter the Florida Legislature.
One of the bill's sponsors, Representative Dennis K. Baxley, stated that
the law would "curb violent crime and make the citizens of Florida
safer,"" and that the passing of the law is "a clear position that we will
stand with victims of violent attacks when the law is in their favor."'
12
Former NRA President Marion Hammer, 3 who is currently a powerful
NRA lobbyist in Florida,'4 said that the new law was necessary to
restore and codify the Castle Doctrine and self-defense rights that the
courts had eroded over the years.15 She further claimed that these
changes were needed because prosecutors have prosecuted "homeown-
ers who shoot to defend their lives and homes."' 6 Hammer said, "Prose-
cutors are always looking for somebody to prosecute and too often it's
the victim. [The prosecutors] are part of the problem."' 7
imminent danger to oneself can be avoided." Id. at 417 (quoting State v. Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d 724,
728 (Fla. 1982) (Overton, J., dissenting)).
7. See, e.g., Abby Goodnough, Florida Expands Right To Use Deadly Force in Self-Defense,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2005, at A18; Larry Keller, Self-Defense Law Troubles Prosecutor, PALM
BEACH POST, June 27, 2007, at IB; Adam Liptak, 15 States Expand Right To Shoot in Self-
Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2006, at Al.
8. The vote in the Senate was thirty-nine yeas to zero nays, and the vote in the House of
Representatives was 94 yeas to 20 nays. See H.R. J. 12, Reg. Sess., at 342-43 (Fla. 2005); S. J. 8,
Reg. Sess., at 262-63 (Fla. 2005); see also Dan Christensen, NRA Uses New Florida Gun Law as
National Model, 79 DAILY Bus. REv. Al, AI5 (2005).
9. See Goodnough, supra note 7.
10. See Christensen, supra note 8.
I1. Goodnough, supra note 7.
12. ld.
13. Denise M. Drake, Comment, The Castle Doctrine: An Expanding Right To Stand Your
Ground, ST. MARY'S L.J. 573, 576 (2008).
14. See Todd Leskanic, Several States Consider 'Stand Your Ground' Bills, TAMPA TRIB.,
Mar. 13, 2006, at 1.
15. See Christensen, supra note 8, at A17.
16. Id.
17. Id. Prosecutors seem to disagree with Hammer's statements, however, and claim that
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Opponents of the legislation, including prosecutors, claim the bill
unnecessarily expanded the right to use deadly force in self-defense. 8
Florida House Representative Dan Gelber, one of twenty representatives
who voted against the bill, stated that "[i]t legalizes dueling. It legalizes
fighting to the point of death, without anybody having a duty to
retreat."' 9 Elizabeth Haile, an attorney for the Brady Campaign to Pre-
vent Gun Violence, declared that the law was unnecessary because "[i]f
you are protecting yourself or your family in self defense, that's a basic
legal right anyway. '"20 Critics also went so far as to suggest the law
would turn "the state of Florida into the O.K. Corral.'
After the law passed with overpowering support in Florida, the
NRA vowed to promote similar legislation throughout the nation.22 As
in Florida, the NRA's self-interested crusade to pass "Stand Your
Ground" laws did not discourage many other states' legislatures. Twenty
three states have followed Florida's lead in passing similar legislation,
including Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and
Texas .23
The NRA has not been completely successful, though. Similar leg-
islation was rejected in Wyoming and Virginia, both of which are con-
sidered "gun-friendly" and conservative states. 24 The House Judiciary
Committee in Wyoming voted against the proposed legislation "after the
Wyoming Sheriffs Association and state trial lawyers association testi-
fied against it."25
With the laws' prevalence, the issues surrounding the laws will
continue to be widely debated and legislated throughout the country. An
there is no evidence indicating that prosecutors had been charging individuals who were using
deadly force in self-defense when it was justified under the law. See id. at A 15-17.
18. See Fred Grimm, New Law Gives Too Many People a License To Kill, MIAMI HERALD,
Aug. 24, 2006, at lB.
19. Bill Cotterell, House Passes Self-Defense Bill, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Apr. 6, 2005, at
A4.
20. Laws Bolstering Defense Rights Bring Confusion, AUGUSTA CHRON., July 10, 2007, at
A03.
21. Cotterell, supra note 19; see also Grimm, supra note 18.
22. See Goodnough, supra note 7.
23. See Castle Doctrine: Protecting Our Right to Self-Defense, http://www.nraila.org/images/
cd.jpg (last visited Oct. 14, 2008); see also Michael E. Young, Rights Issue Elicits Passion on
Both Sides: NRA, Brady Group Take Their Messages to States Weighing 'Castle Law,' DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Jan. 20, 2008, at 25A.
24. See Kavan Peterson, More States Sanction Deadly Force, STATELNE.ORG, Apr. 26, 2006,
http://www.stateline.orglive/details/story?contentld=107276.
25. Id.
2008]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
analysis and critique of Florida's legislation-the first of its kind-can
supply an important perspective to the debate.
The Florida law has numerous troubling aspects that create a multi-
tude of questions including whether the law is working properly and
whether the law provides adequate standards for prosecutors and law
enforcement to follow in order to enforce the law. Considering the sig-
nificant support of the law by the Florida Legislature and the NRA, the
"Stand Your Ground" law appears to be here to stay, and advocacy that
the law be repealed may be futile. Thus, perhaps the best avenue for
change is to advocate for amendments to the law.
This article addresses problematic aspects of the law and its actual
effects in Florida and then makes recommendations for amendments that
would eradicate some of the law's problems. Part One of this article
introduces the Protection of Persons Bill and the changes that it made to
Florida law. Part Two addresses issues that have arisen with the law,
including dissent among prosecutors and law enforcement, the irrebut-
table presumption of an intruder's malicious intent, confusion with the
application of the law and the law's functioning as more of a bar to
prosecution than a defense, and troublesome incidents that have
occurred in Florida. Next, Part Three lays out recommendations for cre-
ating a system to track claims of self-defense, recommends amendments
to the current law, and explains the rationales behind the recommenda-
tions. Finally, Part Four concludes and summarizes how the recom-
mended amendments can serve the purpose of clarifying and improving
the law to the benefit of prosecutors, law enforcement, and Florida
citizens.
I. THE RISE OF "STAND YOUR GROUND"
Jack King, the spokesman for the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers, stated, "'Most people would rather be judged by 12
than carried by six,' referring to juries and pallbearers."26 King's state-
ment encapsulates a view of self-defense that advocates using deadly
force even when the circumstances are questionable as to whether such
force is permissible because it is better to use deadly force and be judged
by a jury than taking the chance of not using such force and ending up
dead. The Florida legislature apparently agreed with this view when it
passed the Protection of Persons Bill. 27 The legislature's purported ratio-
nale for passing the law was:
WHEREAS, the Legislature finds that it is proper for law-abiding
people to protect themselves, their families, and others from intruders
26. Laws Bolstering Defense Rights Bring Confusion, supra note 20.
27. See FLA. STAT. §§ 776.012, 776.013, 776.031, 776.032 (2007).
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and attackers without fear of prosecution or civil action for acting in
defense of themselves and others, and
WHEREAS, the castle doctrine is a common-law doctrine of ancient
origins which declares that a person's home is his or her castle, and
WHEREAS, Section 8 of Article I of the State Constitution guaran-
tees the right of the people to bear arms in defense of themselves, and
WHEREAS, the persons residing in or visiting this state have a right
to expect to remain unmolested within their homes or vehicles, and
WHEREAS, no person or victim of crime should be required to sur-
render his or her personal safety to a criminal, nor should a person or
victim be required to needlessly retreat in the face of intrusion or
attack ....8
The new law, which took effect on October 1, 2005, substantially
amended sections 776.012 and 776.031 and created sections 776.013
and 776.032 of the Florida Statutes. 29 The amendment to section
776.012 eliminated the duty to retreat before using deadly force.3 °
Newly added section 776.013, entitled "Home protection; use of deadly
force; presumption of fear of death or great bodily harm," states that a
person is presumed to have the reasonable fear necessary to use deadly
force if the person against whom the deadly force was directed was
unlawfully and forcefully entering or had entered specified areas, includ-
ing a dwelling, 3 residence, 32 or occupied vehicle, 33 "or if the person had
removed or was attempting to remove another person against [his or her]
will" from these areas.34 For the presumption to apply, the statute also
requires that the person who used the deadly force "knew or had reason
to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible
28. 2005 Fla. Laws 199, 200.
29. See id. at 199-202.
30. Section 776.012 of the Florida Statutes, entitled, "Use of force in defense of person," was
amended to state:
[A] person is justified in the use of deadly force and does not have a duty to retreat
if:
(I) He oi she reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent
death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the
imminent commission of a forcible felony; or
(2) Under those circumstances permitted pursuant to s. 776.013.
Id. at 201.
31. "'Dwelling' means a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch,
whether the building or conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a
roof over it, including a tent, and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night."
FLA. STAT. § 776.013(5)(a) (2007).
32. "'Residence' means a dwelling in which a person resides either temporarily or
permanently or is visiting as an invited guest." Id. § 776.013(5)(b).
33. "'Vehicle' means a conveyance of any kind, whether or not motorized, which is designed
to transport people or property." Id. § 776.013(5)(c).
34. See id. § 776.013(l)(a).
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act was occurring or had occurred. 35 Section 776.013(4) specifically
states that any person who unlawfully and forcefully enters or attempts
to enter another person's castle, defined to include a dwelling, residence,
or occupied vehicle, is "presumed to be doing so with the intent to com-
mit an unlawful act involving force or violence. 36
Additionally, section 776.013(3), which addresses the ability to
"stand your ground" in any place that a person legally has a right to be,
states:
A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is
attacked in any other place where he or she has a right to be has no
duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground and meet
force with force, including deadly force if he or she reasonably
believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm
to himself or herself or another or to prevent the commission of a
forcible felony.37
This provision is a significant departure from Florida common law,
which required a person to use every reasonable means available to
retreat before using deadly force, except when the person was in his or
her home or place of work.38 By amending this section, the legislature
did away with the common law duty to retreat before using deadly force
in all places so long as the person meets the requirements of the statute:
A person may use deadly force against another so long as he or she is
somewhere he has a legal right to be (e.g., public streets, shopping cen-
ters) and he or she has a "reasonable belief' that the use of deadly force
is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury or death. 39 The statute is
silent as to whether the use of deadly force is permitted under these
circumstances if an attacker is unarmed4 °, but some have inferred this to
be the case.41 Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal recently inter-
preted this provision as placing "no duty on the person to avoid or
retreat from danger, so long as that person is not engaged in an unlawful
35. Id. § 776.013(I)(b).
36. Id. § 776.013(4).
37. Id. § 776.013(3). "Forcible felony," as defined by section 776.08 of the Florida Statutes
means "treason; murder; manslaughter; sexual battery; carjacking; home-invasion robbery;
robbery; burglary; arson; kidnapping; aggravated assault; aggravated battery; aggravated stalking;
aircraft piracy; unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb; and
any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any
individual." FLA. STAT. § 776.08 (2007).
38. See State v. James, 867 So. 2d 414, 416 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
39. See § 776.013(3).
40. See § 776.013. The statute does not address what is required to create reasonable belief or
fear and does not require an assailant to be armed in order for a person to have the reasonable fear
necessary to justify using deadly force.
41. Henry Pierson Curtis, Gun Law Triggers at Least 13 Shootings, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June
11, 2006, at Al.
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activity and is located in a place where he or she has a right to be."42
Thus, the law allows people to use deadly force so long as they feel
threatened with death or great bodily harm, even if a person has other
means of protecting his or her safety, such as calling the police or
retreating from the situation if it is possible to do so safely.
Like section 776.012, section 776.031 was amended to codify the
position that a duty to retreat so long as a person is somewhere they are
lawfully permitted to be no longer exists.4 3 Although the title of this
section is "[u]se of force in defense of others," it actually pertains to the
use of force for protecting property.' The use of deadly force is only
justified in the protection of property when a person "reasonably
believes that such force is necessary to prevent the imminent commis-
sion of a forcible felony."45
In addition to section 776.013 discussed above, Senate Bill 436
also created section 776.032 of the Florida Statutes. 46 This section pro-
vides that a person who is permitted to use deadly force under sections
776.012, 776.013, and 776.031 receives immunity from "criminal prose-
cution and civil action for the use of such force."47 The immunity from
criminal prosecution includes immunity from arrest, detention in cus-
tody, and charges or prosecution of the individual for using deadly
force.48 Section 776.032(2) of the statute further states that "[a] law
enforcement agency may use standard procedures for investigating the
use of force as described in subsection (1), but the agency may not arrest
the person for using force unless it determines that there is probable
cause that the force that was used was unlawful."49 With the changes in
the law brought by Senate Bill 436 have come major problems for prose-
cutors, law enforcement, and the general public.
II. PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF THE LAW
A. Opposition by Prosecutors and Law Enforcement
As agents of the State, prosecutors and law enforcement groups are
charged W.,h the duty to enforce the iaw. in Florida, both groups pub-
licly voiced their opposition to the "Stand Your Ground" law, but unfor-
42. McWhorter v. State, 971 So. 2d 154, 157 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
43. Section 776.031 of the Florida Statutes, entitled "Use of force in defense of others," was
amended to read that "[a] person does not have a duty to retreat if the person is in a place where he
or she has a right to be." FLA. STAT. § 776.031 (2007).
44. See id. § 776.031.
45. Id.
46. 2005 Fla. Laws 199, 202.
47. FLA. STAT. § 776.032 (2007).
48. See id. § 776.032(1).
49. Id. § 776.032(2).
2008]
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tunately the legislature did not seem to listen. Palm Beach State
Attorney Barry Krischer stated, "I dislike the law because it encourages
people to stand their ground . . . when they could just as easily walk
away. To me, that's not a civilized society. '5° Krischer also discussed
his belief that the law is not protecting the individuals from prosecution
and civil liability that the legislature intended; instead, he believes that it
provides protection for criminals because criminals, rather than law-
abiding citizens, are the individuals who are actually shooting each
other.51 Krischer fears that the law makes people more inclined to shoot
when faced with confrontation, especially because the law extended an
authorization to use deadly force against an attacker in public. 2 Paul A.
Logli, president of the National District Attorneys Association, voiced
his opinion of the law when he said, "[The 'Stand Your Ground' laws]
basically giv[e] citizens more rights to use deadly force than we give
police officers, and with less review." 3 Leon County State Attorney
Willie Meggs, president of the Florida Prosecuting Attorneys Associa-
tion, called the legislation the "shoot your Avon Lady law" and believes
the law was unreasonable and unnecessary because there was no indica-
tion that individuals were being prosecuted unjustly for defending them-
selves. 54 Like Krischer, Meggs believes this law will protect individuals
the legislature did not intend to shield.55 Meggs stated that "[a]ll this
may do is give a legal defense to a bad person who would otherwise be
prosecuted. The person who is dead doesn't get to say what they were
going to do."' 56 Broward State Attorney Mike Satz concurs with Meggs
that the law was unnecessary and thinks it creates opportunities for indi-
viduals to take advantage of the law's provisions who should not be
entitled to do so. 7 One example of this would be if two individuals from
rival gangs engaged in a gunfight where one of the individuals is killed,
and the one still standing claimed he or she had a reasonable fear of
death or great bodily harm, thereby justifying the use of deadly force
under the law. Considering the fact that prosecutors are public servants
with the duty to seek justice and prosecute the individuals who violate
the law, it is a wonder that their opinions seemed to have such little
influence on the legislature's decision to pass the law.
Law enforcement officials, including Miami Police Chief John F.
50. Keller, supra note 7.
51. See id.; see also Christensen, supra note 8, at Al, A15-A17.
52. See Christensen, supra note 8, at A15-A17.
53. Liptak, supra note 7.
54. See Christensen, supra note 8, at A15.
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. See id. at A15-A17.
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Timoney and St. Petersburg Police Chief Chuck Harmon have also
voiced similar dissent to the law.58 Chief Timoney claimed the law is
dangerous and ultimately unnecessary.59 He feared that many people
could become innocent victims, including children, and that the law
gave drivers with road rage and intoxicated bar patrons the belief that
they have immunity when they use firearms in an altercation. 60 Chief
Timoney stated, "Whether it's trick-or-treaters or kids playing in the
yard of someone who doesn't want them there or some drunk guy stum-
bling into the wrong house ... [the law is] encouraging people to possi-
bly use deadly physical force where it shouldn't be used.
6 1
The legislature's choice to pass the law is disconcerting considering
prosecutors' and law enforcements' opposition to it. One would think
that the opinions of the very individuals who have the responsibility to
enforce and prosecute the law would be given greater weight by the
legislature, particularly when the law directly impacts their jobs. Despite
opposition by these groups, the law overwhelmingly passed and remains
in force.
B. The Conclusive Presumptions of a Reasonable Fear of Death or
Great Bodily Harm and of an Intruder's Malicious Intent
Another problematic aspect of the law that has driven dissent is its
creation of conclusive presumptions of a reasonable fear of death or
great bodily harm under section 776.013(1) and of an intruder's mali-
cious intent under section 776.013(4). If an individual proves the two
elements of section 776.013(1)(a)-(b)-that an intruder had unlawfully
entered or was attempting to enter or was unlawfully removing or had
removed a person against his or her will from the individual's "castle"
and that the individual knew such unlawful act was occurring-and does
not fall within the exceptions listed by section 776.013(2)(a)-(d),62 the
58. See Goodnough, supra note 7.
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. See FLA. STAT. § 776.013(2)(a)-(d) (2007). There are four situations where the
presumption does not apply. First, the presumption does not apply if the person against whom
defensive force is used is a lawful resident of the specified area, such as an owner, lessee, or
titleholder, and if there is not "an injunction for protection from domestic violence" or a pretrial
order of no contact against that person. See id. § 776.013(2)(a). Second, the person being removed
from a dwelling, residence, or vehicle cannot be a child, grandchild, or other person in the lawful
custody or guardianship of the person against whom the defensive force is used. See id.
§ 776.013(2)(b). Third, the person using defensive force cannot be "engaged in an unlawful
activity" and cannot be "using the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle to further an unlawful
activity." Id. § 776.013(2)(c). Fourth, the person against whom the defensive force is used cannot
be a law enforcement officer who is acting within his or her official duties in entering or
attempting to enter the specified areas if the officer had identified him or herself or the person
2008]
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law creates a presumption of having the reasonable fear of death or great
bodily harm necessary to justify using deadly force.63 Although not spe-
cifically delineated in the statute, the presumption created by this provi-
sion has been interpreted to be conclusive and irrebuttable. 64 The Senate
Judiciary Committee stated that "[l]egal presumptions, are typically
rebuttable. The presumptions created by the committee substitute, how-
ever, appear to be conclusive," and the committee substitute (the form of
the bill adopted) "does not require proof that the intruder was attempting
to engage in a forcible felony. Under the committee substitute, the
intruder's actual intent is irrelevant. The committee substitute, in effect,
appears to create a conclusive presumption of the intruder's malicious
intent. 65
Indeed, the Florida House of Representatives specifically rejected
an amendment by Representative Seiler that would have made the pre-
sumptions rebuttable with other evidence.66 The courts have followed
the legislature's lead. A Florida appellate court has interpreted the pre-
sumptions to be conclusive.67 In State v. Heckman, the Florida Second
District Court of Appeal stated that the presumptions were irrebuttable,
citing to the Senate Committee's Staff Analysis 5-6 from February 25,
2005.68
Anthony J. Sebok, a law professor at Brooklyn Law School, thinks
the law's central innovation is that it allows individuals to use deadly
force in defense of property against an intruder.69 Professor Sebok has
stated the law contravenes a long-held principle of law: The value of life
outweighs the value of protecting property.70 Thus, he believes there is
the potential for "serious miscarriages of justice" when there is a pre-
sumption that every unlawful intruder intends to threaten the lives of
people within the expanded "castle" the law creates. 7' Professor Sebok
using defensive force knew or had reason to know that the individual was a law enforcement
officer. See id. § 776.013(2)(d).
63. See § 776.013(1)(a)-(b).
64. See STAFF OF FLA. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC
IMPACT STATEMENT ON CS/CS/SB 436, at 6 (Reg. Sess. 2005), available at http://www.flsenate.
gov/data/session/2005/Senate/bills/analysis/pdf/2005s0436.ju.pdf; see also State v. Heckman, No.
2D06-5653, 2007 WL 4270594, at *2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2007).
65. STAFF OF FLA. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC
IMPACT STATEMENT ON CS/CS/SB 436, at 6 (Reg. Sess. 2005).
66. See H.R. J., Reg. Sess., at 342 (Fla. 2005).
67. See Heclnan, 2007 WL 4270594, at *2.
68. See id.
69. Liptak, supra note 7; see also Anthony J. Sebok, Florida's New "Stand Your Ground"
Law: Why It's More Extreme than Other States' Self-Defense Measures, and How It Got that Way,
FINDLAW, May 2,.2005, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20050502.html.
70. See id.
71. See id.
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raises an interesting and plausible hypothetical in which the law could
result in such injustice. In this hypothetical, a student breaks into a
teacher's vehicle with intent to vandalize it. Then, the teacher enters the
vehicle and discovers the student. Under these circumstances, the
teacher can use deadly force against the student and be entitled to the
presumption, thus rendering the teacher immune from criminal prosecu-
tion or civil suit.72 Sebok concludes that "the law tells average citizens
they can kill when they reasonably believe that their homes or vehicles
have been illegally and forcibly invaded."73
Under the presumptions created by section 776.013 of the Florida
statutes, Jack King's statement about being carried by six pallbearers
versus being judged by a twelve-person jury" becomes irrelevant. No
longer will a person need to worry about being judged by a jury for
using deadly force so long as the user of force can prove the require-
ments in section 776.013(l)(a)-(b). If the presumption applies, then
there can be no criminal or civil repercussions for the use of deadly
force. When found to apply, the presumption's practical effect is that a
jury will no longer be able to decide the factual question of whether the
defendant had the reasonable fear necessary to use deadly force. Instead,
the factual questions the jury will have to decide are whether the alleged
intruder was attempting or had unlawfully and forcibly entered the
defendant's home, and whether the defendant had reason to know that
such an intrusion had occurred.76
In analyzing the presumptions, one should be discouraged by their
practical effects. The presumed reasonable fear of death or great bodily
harm of the user of force and the malicious intent of an intruder provides
the victim of intrusion too much discretion to use deadly force. These
presumptions eliminate the requirement of necessity and authorize the
use of deadly force, even if non-deadly or no force would have been
reasonable. Essentially, the presumptions allow a person within his "cas-
tle" to act with impunity, even if he or she has no reasonable fear, knows
the intruder does not have any malicious intent, or knows that the use of
deadly force is unreasonable. According to the law, if an intoxicated
teenager enters his neighbor's home by mistaking it for his own, the
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
75. See FLA. STAT. § 776.032(1) (2007).
76. See STAFF OF FLA. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC
IMPACT STATEMENT ON CS/CS/SB 436, at 6 (Reg. Sess. 2005), available at http://www.flsenate.
gov/data/session/2005/Senate/biIls/analysis/pdf/2005s0436.ju.pdf; see also STAFF OF FLA. S.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT ON CS/
SB 436, at 7 (Reg. Sess. 2005), available at http://www.flsenate.gov/data/session/2005/Senate/
bills/analysis/pdf/2005s0436.cj.pdf; see FLA. STAT. § 776.013(1)(a)-(b) (2007).
2008]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
homeowner can presumably use deadly force. Even if the State could
prove that the homeowner knew the intruder was his neighbor's teenager
and that the teen meant no harm, the presumptions entitle him to use
deadly force without having reasonable fear of death or great bodily
harm.
A critical question that should be addressed is the policy choice
behind the irrebuttable presumptions. Creating irrebuttable presumptions
of a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm for the user of force
and of the intruder's malicious intent should make one ask why the leg-
islature would want these presumptions to be irrefutable even if over-
whelming evidence exists that would prove the user of force did not act
reasonably. Miscarriages of justice can occur when the facts tell a differ-
ent story, but the legal presumptions prevent the jury from making deter-
minations as to whether using force was necessary and whether deadly
force was required.
At first glance, the irrebuttable presumptions may seem to be a
sound conception because few would disagree that people have the right
to be free from intrusion in their homes. But a more thorough analysis
should make one question whether this is sound policy. The law should
not abrogate the requirements that reasonable fear must exist in the user
of force and that the amount of force used should be reasonable. Under
sections 776.013(l)(a)-(b) and 776.013(4), the irrebuttable presump-
tions incentivize a "shoot-first" mentality rather than a reasonableness
approach. Because the self-defense law is based on whether or not the
user of force had a reasonable belief of death or great bodily harm, the
law should not impute presumptions of having this reasonable belief, nor
should it vindicate using deadly force when less force would be reasona-
ble. Should not a law based on reasonableness encourage individuals to
act reasonably in all circumstances?
C. The Actual Effects
1. PROSECUTORS: THE LAW AS A BAR TO PROSECUTION
More than two years after the "Stand Your Ground" law went into
effect, the law's actual effects and implications remain elusive. One sig-
nificant factor causing this elusiveness is the lack of judicial interpreta-
tion of the law. Because only a few cases have actually been brought to
trial, the "Stand Your Ground" law may act more as a bar to prosecution
than a defense.
Russell Smith, president-elect of the Florida Association of Crimi-
nal Defense Lawyers, originally thought the law's impact would be seen
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in trials, but he has not found that to be the case. 77 Smith stated that "the
real impact [of the law] has been that it's making filing decisions diffi-
cult for prosecutors. It's causing cases to not be filed at all or to be filed
with reduced charges."78 Smith's statement supports the idea that the
law acts more as a bar to prosecution than a defense, as does the experi-
ence of Duval County State Attorney Harry Shorstein.79 Shorstein
believes that although the law cannot be blamed for the homicide binge
in his jurisdiction, it has significantly influenced a handful of homicide
and attempted homicide cases.80 Shorstein thinks the law has hindered
prosecutors. 81 Although only implicated in a few cases in his jurisdic-
tion, he believes the law has a wide and prevalent influence on cases that
is "difficult to document. '8 2 He stated:
[The law] caused a general expansion of self-defense, which makes
all issues of self-defense more favorable to the defendant or suspect
than before .... It's also created a greater propensity to use deadly
force than existed before. There's a lesser sensitivity to gun violence
and death, and that's not good.83
Thus, according to prosecutors, the law has not turned Florida into
the Wild West, nor has it caused a demonstrable increase in homicides.84
But it does have an impact on decisions of whether to prosecute at all or
bring reduced charges against individuals using deadly force.8
The assertion that the law acts more as a bar to prosecution than a
defense cannot be fully substantiated, however, because statistics on the
number of self-defense claims statewide, either before or after the law
took effect, are not available.86 Nonetheless, some documented cases
where charges are reduced or not brought at all are illustrative of how
the law can function as a bar to prosecution or a bargaining chip for
defendants in plea deals.87 An article in the Orlando Sentinel newspaper
on June 11, 2006, stated that since the law went into effect on October 1,
77. J. Taylor Rushing, Deadly-Force Law Has an Effect, but Florida Hasn't Become the Wild
West; State Attorneys Say It Makes Filing Charges More Difficult for Prosecutors, FLA. TIMES-
UNION, July 10, 2006, at A-1.
78. id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See Henry Pierson Curtis, Gun Lw Triggers at Least 13 Shootings, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
June 11, 2006, at Al.
87. See generally id. (documenting the new law's effects); Rushing, supra note 77; see also
Missy Diaz, Teenager Takes Plea Deal in Stabbing Case, FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 29, 2007, at
lB.
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2005, at least 13 people in Central Florida used firearms and claimed the
law's protection.88 The incidents resulted in six dead and four wounded,
and all but one of the ten deceased or maimed were unarmed. 89 At the
time of the report, five of the shooters had been cleared of all charges,
three shooters had been charged, and the remaining incidents were still
under review.90
Duval County State Attorney Shorstein cited five cases where the
law has influenced the State Attorney office's decisions in cases, result-
ing in refraining from filing charges or reducing charges. 9' These cases
included an incident where a man was shot by a motorist following an
argument where the man allegedly attacked the motorist, an incident
where a man was shot and killed by an acquaintance in a domestic dis-
pute, and a road rage episode where a woman was stabbed to death by
another woman.92
Similarly, the law affected a case in which a man stabbed another at
a party. The prosecutors in that case gave the defendant a deal for seven
years in prison if he pled guilty to manslaughter.93 Assistant State Attor-
ney Andy Slater stated that the "Stand Your Ground" law coupled with
conflicting witness testimony caused him to offer the plea agreement. 94
The defendant's defense attorney, Richard Lubin, thought the deal was
in the best interest of his client, even though he felt they had a strong
defense, because it eliminated the possibility of his client receiving a
sentence of life imprisonment for second-degree murder. 9
Based on these incidents, the law is acting more as a bar to prosecu-
tion or a plea bargaining chip rather than a defense. However, unless
statistics are produced regarding all cases that involve claims of self-
defense, it will remain impossible to tell whether these examples are
anomalies or whether they are actually representative of the effects of
the law. Nonetheless, the incidents which never reach the inside of a
courtroom because charges are not brought or reduced plea deals are
accepted are the most important in determining how the law functions in
practice. Thus, a system to track claims of self-defense and how these
claims are handled and resolved is imperative for determining the law's
actual effects. The recommendation for this type of system is further
discussed in Section III. Another impact of the law that plays an integral
88. See Curtis, supra note 86.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See Rushing, supra note 77.
92. See id.
93. See Diaz, supra note 87.
94. See id.
95. See id.
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role in determining whether or not an individual claiming the law's pro-
tections is charged and prosecuted is law enforcement's investigation
and handling of incidents.
2. LAW ENFORCEMENT: VARYING METHODS FOR HANDLING INCIDENTS
The "Stand Your Ground" legislation altered how law enforcement
assesses and handles incidents involving self-defense claims. Under sec-
tion 776.032(2) of the Florida statutes, the police are forbidden to arrest
or detain a suspect unless they have evidence establishing probable
cause that the force used was unlawful.9 6 Thus, although the law
requires self-defense claims to be investigated, an individual claiming he
or she acted in self-defense cannot even be arrested unless the police
have evidence that the person's actions do not fit within the require-
ments of the statute.97
The effect of these changes is illustrated by five months of court
records for Lake, Orange, Osceola, Polk, Seminole, and Volusia coun-
ties. These records showed "widespread differences in the way claims
are investigated and prosecuted."98 Assessment of the records uncovered
that some incidents received over twenty hours of investigation by
detectives, while others were sent straight to the prosecutors' offices and
were never reviewed by detectives. 99
A comparison of the handling of three incidents illustrates the vary-
ing methods of investigating cases by law enforcement. In one incident,
an off-duty police officer who used deadly force and claimed he feared
for his life while drinking at an acquaintance's house was arrested and
charged by the Seminole County Sherriff's Office.' 00 The prosecutors
subsequently dropped the charges after interviewing the witness for
approximately fifteen hours and deciding that there was insufficient evi-
dence to rebut the officer's self-defense claim. 10 1 But the Orange County
Sheriffs Office did not consult the State Attorney's Office when decid-
ing not to bring charges against a homeowner who shot and wounded an
intoxicated intruder who believed he had entered a friend's house.
10 2
In yet another Orange County incident, the law enforcement
agency's on-call detective did not investigate a shooting where a fifteen-
year-old male suspected of attempting to steal a car was shot in the back
96. See FLA. STAT. § 776.032(2) (2007).
97. See id.
98. Curtis, supra note 86.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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of the leg by the car owner's husband.' 03 Although a witness claimed
that the young man may have been shot while he was running away, the
detective instructed deputies to forward their reports straight to the State
Attorney's office. "
Some investigators argue that the law has not changed how inci-
dents are assessed and investigated by law enforcement agencies.
Others, including Sergeant Rich Ring, head of the Orlando Police's
Homicide Squad, assert the opposite conclusion. 05 Ring stated that
while the claims are still investigated, the change is that, "[i]n the old
days, we'd say 'Where is the weapon?' Now the person only needs to
have a 'reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm' and be able to
articulate it ... But what's reasonable fear? It's so vague, it's different
for every one."106
The varying amounts of time spent investigating and the different
methods for handling incidents involving claims of self-defense under
the law is difficult to reconcile with the desire for the law to be applied
uniformly. Because cases are not handled uniformly, too much discre-
tion may be vested in law enforcement. This is especially troubling if
law enforcement can pick and choose which incidents to investigate
more thoroughly than others because it opens the door for personal bias,
such as racial or gender animus, to play an improper role in the police's
decisions. Furthermore, the varying procedures used by law enforcement
for investigating incidents of self-defense under the law raises other
questions: Does section 776.032(2) of the law hinder law enforcement
agencies' ability to investigate self-defense claims? If so, does it give
law enforcement disincentive to investigate? Among other factors, the
unclear aspects of the law and the lack of uniformity by law enforcement
in investigating incidents have contributed to a number of troubling epi-
sodes in Florida.
3. INCIDENTS IN FLORIDA
Despite the lack of specific statistics regarding the law's effect on
how many incidents using deadly force are claiming the law's protec-
tions and whether or not users of force are being prosecuted or given
reduced sentences via plea bargains, numerous incidents in Florida raise
serious questions as to the application of the law. A sampling of these
incidents strikes at the center of the controversies surrounding the law,
including who should be able to claim the law's protections, whether
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. Id.
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charges should be brought against the person who used deadly force,
whether the law is even applicable, and whether amendments should be
made to the law. The first incident provides a basis for exploring the
problem with determining what constitutes "unlawful activity" under the
law. The second shows issues that can arise with the irrebuttable pre-
sumption. The third illustrates problems with the statute failing to state
the amount of force that can be used in self-defense and the law's appli-
cation to defense of others. Finally, the fourth incident shows one of the
problematic aspects of providing immunity from all criminal prosecu-
tion and civil suits.
On June 11, 2006, Jacqueline Galas, a prostitute of New Port
Richey, shot and killed her longtime client Frank Labiento. 10 7 According
to the police and prosecutors, the evidence showed that Labiento
intended to kill Galas. In fact, he told her of his intent while the two sat
at Labiento's kitchen table.'08 When Labiento stood up to answer the
phone, he left his .357-caliber handgun on the table in front of Galas."°9
According to the story she told police, Labiento then came at her in a
threatening manner, and she shot him in the chest."' The arrest report
stated that Galas "made no attempt to flee, nor did she verbally warn the
victim that she was going to shoot him,"1"' and she did not call for
medical help as Labiento was dying.' I2 Although originally arrested and
charged with second-degree murder, prosecutors dropped the charge.I 3
Assistant State Attorney Michael Halkitis stated that Galas's decision to
shoot rather than flee would have made his choice not to prosecute much
more difficult under the old law which still required the duty to retreat
before using deadly force.' 4 Halkitis further remarked, "It's a very clear
case of an issue covered by 'Stand Your Ground.' "115
But Halkitis's statement that this is clearly covered by the law
should be questioned. Section 776.013(3) states that a person may only
use deadly force if he or she is attacked, is not engaged in an unlawful
activity, and is in a place where he or she has a legal right to be.' 16 Galas
admitted she was working as a prostitute and that she regularly "per-
107. David Sommer, Prosecutors Drop Murder Charge Against Prostitute, TAMPA TRIB., July
27, 2006, at 15.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Liptak, supra note 7.
115. Sommer, supra note 107.
116. See FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2007).
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formed sex acts with Labiento in exchange for money."'117 This raises
the questions of what constitutes being engaged in an "unlawful activ-
ity," and when the law's protections should apply. Galas may not have
been engaged in sex for money at the exact time when she used deadly
force against Labiento, but she did admit to acting in her capacity as a
prostitute.
Similarly, imagine a scenario where an individual was dealing
drugs to a customer in the customer's home, and the customer attacked
the dealer. At the time the drug dealer was attacked and reasonably used
deadly force in self-defense against the customer, he or she was not
actively exchanging the drugs for money. Should the drug dealer be enti-
tled to assert the defense? When there is not an explicit definition of
"unlawful activity," it is unclear as to who should be able to claim the
law's protections.
A critical analysis of this incident reveals numerous problems with
the "unlawful activity" provision. The provision lacks any definition or
explanation, so it is impossible to know the precise time-framing and
degree of unlawful activity that will cause a user of force not to be pro-
tected by the law. For example, is a person who trespasses on another's
land or a person carrying an unlicensed firearm exempt from the law's
protection, even if the person is faced with an attack which will cause
death or great bodily harm? When there is no clear definition of this
provision, it gives too much discretion to prosecutors and law enforce-
ment to decide whether or not the provision is applicable and thus
whether or not a person will receive the law's protections.
The circumstances of another incident illustrate the problem with
the irrebuttable presumptions created in favor of the person using deadly
force under section 776.013. Jason M. Rosenbloom was shot twice by
his neighbor Kenneth Allen in Allen's doorway." 8 Allen had com-
plained to the local authorities about Rosenbloom putting out more trash
bags than local ordinances allowed. 19 When Rosenbloom knocked on
Allen's door, the two men began to argue.' 2 ° Allen claimed that Rosen-
bloom had his foot in the door and was attempting to rush inside the
house before he pulled the trigger.'2 ' Rosenbloom denied this allega-
tion."' The conflicting claims only converge on the fact that Allen shotRosenbloom, who was unarmed, in the stomach and then in the chest. 2 3
117. Sommer, supra note 107.
118. See Liptak, supra note 7.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. Id.
123. See id.
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Afterward, Allen said he was afraid, 124 and stated, "I have a right.., to
keep my house safe."'
' 25
Without other witnesses, it is Allen's claim versus Rosenbloom's
claim. Section 776.013(1)(a)-(b) would protect Allen from civil and
criminal suits so long as he could show that Rosenbloom was "unlaw-
fully" and "forcibly" entering or attempting to enter his home, and that
he believed such entry was occurring when he shot Rosenbloom. If
Allen proved this, then he is presumed to have the reasonable fear neces-
sary to justify using deadly force. 126 Thus, even if the State could prove
that Allen did not fear Rosenbloom and could see that he was plainly
unarmed and had no malicious intent, it is irrelevant because the pre-
sumption in favor of Allen is conclusive and irrebuttable.12 7
One should question whether justice was done in this situation. If
there was evidence that Allen did not have reasonable fear or that
Rosenbloom had no malicious intent, then the presumptions should be
rebuttable so that such injustice does not occur. In this incident, it was a
case of a dispute between acquaintances that escalated into violence, not
a situation where a homeowner finds a random burglar inside his home
and has to make a split-second decision. This is not the type of incident
in which the user of force should be unquestionably protected by irrebut-
table presumptions. Rather, it is exactly the type of scenario where the
facts regarding the user of force's reasonableness in the need to use
force and the use of deadly force-as opposed to less force-should be
used to determine whether the act was justified self-defense.
Another incident particularly shows the issues that can arise with
the law's failure to specifically state the amount of force that can be
used and the application of the law to defense of others claims. Michael
Frazzini was in a camouflage mask and carrying a fourteen-inch souve-
nir baseball bat when he was shot and killed by Todd Rasmussen. 28
According to Frazzini's family, Frazzini was watching over his mother's
home and backyard because she thought twenty-two-year-old Corey
Rasmussen "had stolen her car keys and [had been] disturbing her prop-
e ry.' 2 9 The only accounts of the events that transpired and led to the
124. Grimm, supra note 18.
125. Liptak, supra note 7.
126. See FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2007).
127. See STAFF OF FLA. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SENATE STAFF AND ECONOMIC IMPACT
STATEMENT ON CS/CS/SB 436, at 6 (Reg. Sess. 2005), available at http://www.flsenate.gov/data/
session/2005/Senate/bills/analysis/pdf/2005s0436.ju.pdf; see also State v. Heckman, No. 2D06-
5653, 2007 WL 4270594, at *3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2007).
128. Jacob Ogles, Shooting Protected by Law in Question, NEWS-PRESS (Fort Myers), Aug. 4,
2006, at 1A.
129. Id.
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death of Frazzini are from Todd Rasmussen and his family. 130 Corey
Rasmussen, Todd's son, was alerted by his sister that someone was lurk-
ing in the bushes behind the backyard. 31 Corey confronted and pulled a
knife on Frazzini when he saw Frazzini's novelty bat (which he alleg-
edly believed to be a lead pipe).' 32 Todd Rasmussen told police that he
had his daughter retrieve his .357 revolver and went outside where he
saw Corey and Frazzini standing off.13 3 According to Todd, he yelled a
warning, and then he shot and killed Frazzini, claiming Frazzini lunged
at him and Corey.
134
The prosecutors declined to arrest or bring charges against Todd
Rasmussen for murder or manslaughter because they said that so long as
Todd Rasmussen had fear of death or bodily injury to himself or
another-in this case his son-then he had the right to use deadly
force. 35 The prosecuting attorney, Hamid Hunter, said that, taking the
Rasmussen family's account of events at "face value," there was reason-
able belief that Todd Rasmussen feared for his son's life. 13 6 Lee County
Chief Assistant State Attorney Randy McGruther remarked that the state
would not prosecute a case if there is not a reasonable belief that a jury
will convict. 1 37 Hunter candidly concluded, "Nobody involved in this
decision feels good about it.'
' 38
Originally, the state attorney's report stated that Frazzini's body
was found on Todd Rasmussen's property. 39 Further investigation
found that Frazzini was actually found on his mother's property. 4 ° The
prosecuting attorney, Hunter, admitted the error and that he had never
actually been to the scene of the crime; however, the prosecutor's office
still determined that Todd Rasmussen should not be charged.' 4 ' The
prosecutors claimed that where Frazzini was killed is not a factor under
"Stand Your Ground" because the law simply requires that Rasmussen
reasonably fear for the life of his son in order for him to legally exercise
deadly force. 42
This incident illustrates the issue that can arise because the statute
130. Id.
131. Sam Cook, Stand Your Ground Law Intimidates Prosecutors, NEWS-PRESS (Fort Myers),
Aug. 6, 2006, at 1B.
132. Ogles, supra note 128.
133. Id.
134. Cook, supra note 131.
135. Ogles, supra note 128.
136. Id.
137. Id.; see also Cook, supra note 131.
138. Ogles, supra note 128.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
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does not explicitly specify the appropriate/permitted amount of force
that can be used in self-defense. The fact that Frazzini was holding a
novelty bat compared to the knife-carrying Corey Rasmussen and gun-
carrying Todd Rasmussen has even caused one of the law's co-sponsors
to question the application of "Stand Your Ground."' 14 3 State Represen-
tative Jeff Kottkamp stated, "The intent is that you can only use the
same amount of force as you believe will be used against you .... It
certainly wasn't that you can shoot and kill somebody wielding a souve-
nir baseball bat."' 44 But that distinction is not clear from the wording of
the law.1"5 Without a requirement of commensurate force specifically
written into the law there is no room for interpretation, which can result
in injustice.
The Rasmussen/Frazzini incident also shows another problem with
the law's application to defense of others. 46 Representative Kottkamp
stated that the Florida Legislature did not intend for the law to protect
individuals who charged at others with deadly weapons and that "[Fraz-
zini] was found on his mother's property, so I don't know how Stand
Your Ground applies.""' 7 According to Hunter, however, the law applies
because Corey and Todd Rasmussen were someplace they had a right to
be-in their backyard and utility easement-and Todd Rasmussen had a
reasonable belief that Frazzini was going to kill or do great bodily injury
to his son."48
But if Corey Rasmussen was the original aggressor by confronting
and brandishing a knife against Frazzini, should the law protect Todd
Rasmussen for shooting and killing Frazzini? Should Rasmussen have
been able to use this amount of force when the person he shot was hold-
ing a toy bat and the person he was protecting was holding a knife?
There is something inherently unjust in this type of circumstance. Under
the "Stand Your Ground" law, however, Hunter is likely correct because
section 776.012 appears to envelop the mistake of fact defense and turns
the assessment solely into a reasonableness inquiry. "' Thus, Todd Ras-
mussen would only be required to show that he had a reasonable belief
that it was necessary to defend Corey Rasmussen to prevent Frazzini
from using force which would cause imminent death or great bodily
harm. Even if it was proved that Corey Rasmussen was the original
aggressor, and Todd Rasmussen was mistaken about this fact, a mistake
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. See FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2007).
146. See id. §§ 776.012, 776.013.
147. Ogles, supra note 128.
148. See id.
149. See § 776.012.
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of fact defense is unnecessary under the law because it only requires
Todd Rasmussen's act to be objectively reasonable. 50 Regardless of
whether or not Todd Rasmussen was mistaken about who was the initial
aggressor, should not a jury decide if he acted objectively reasonable?
This may be an instance of prosecutors using their own discretion to
replace that which should be for a jury to decide.
The incident involving the death of nine-year-old Sherdavia Jenkins
reveals more problems with the law. While playing on the front stoop of
her home, Sherdavia Jenkins was killed by a stray bullet from a shootout
between Damon "Red Rock" Darling and Leroy "Yellow Man"
LaRose.15' Although the police originally said that they would not
charge Darling, both men were eventually arrested and charged with
second-degree murder with a deadly weapon, attempted second-degree
murder with a deadly weapon, and possession of a weapon/firearm by a
convicted felon.'
52
The Jenkins incident raises three more problematic aspects of the
law. First, if a person using deadly force is protected by the law, then
even innocent bystanders who become victims are prohibited from filing
civil suits, and the state cannot bring criminal charges against the user of
deadly force. 153 There is an inherent injustice to families who lose a
loved one and then have no recourse because a law provides absolute
immunity from criminal prosecution and civil suits for a person using
deadly force within the requirements of the statute.
In addition to the troubling idea that the law provides no remedies
for innocent bystanders who are killed or injured by users of deadly
force acting properly in self-defense, there is a second problem with the
legislature's rationale for passing the law. Chief Assistant State Attor-
ney in the Fourth Judicial Circuit of Florida, Jay Plotkin, illustrated this
problem when he said, "[u]nfortunately, you can't write a law that says
only good citizens can use deadly force to protect themselves .. .If a
bad guy is defending himself against another bad guy, the law applies to
him, too."' 54 Although only a hypothetical, as both LaRose and Darling
were eventually charged with second-degree murder and two other
crimes, this scenario raises questions as to whether the people the legis-
lature intended the law to protect are the same people who can claim the
law's protections. If the bullet that struck Jenkins was from the gun of
the individual who responded based on a reasonable fear of death or
150. See id. § 776.012.
151. See Grimm, supra note 18.
152. See Man Charged in Death of Sherdavia Jenkins in Court, CBS4.coM, July 27, 2006,
http://cbs4.com/topstories/Miiami.News.Sherdavia.2.398313.html.
153. See FLA. STAT. § 776.032(1) (2007).
154. Grimm, supra note 18.
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bodily injury, then the shooter would have complete immunity from
both criminal prosecution and civil suits under section 776.032 of the
Florida Statutes.' 55 Should not a law that can result in such incongruous
results be amended so that such results do not occur?
The Florida Legislature declined to make such an amendment. In
response to the Jenkins incident, Senate Bill 878156 and House Bill
371 157 were introduced in the Florida Senate and the Florida House of
Representatives, respectively. These bills sought to amend sections
776.013 and 776.032 of the current law. 158 The suggested amendments
to section 776.013 would require an overt act to support the belief that
the use of deadly force was necessary and would define "[u]nlawful
activity" as an "activity undertaken by a person which is prohibited by
the laws of this state." '59 The bills' amendments to section 776.032
would remove criminal and civil immunity to defendants who harm
innocent bystanders, 61 including children like Sherdavia Jenkins. Both
of these bills died on May 4, 2007, the Senate Bill 878 in the Committee
on Criminal Justice 16 ' and House Bill 371 in the Safety and Security
Council. 162
Third, the outcome of the Jenkins incident presents a significant
problem of too much discretion in how prosecutors apply the law. Here,
this may be a scenario where the prosecutors are willing to bypass the
"Stand Your Ground" law based on their belief that the jury would con-
vict the defendants based on their criminal backgrounds despite the law.
As with the police, the law may vest too much discretion in prosecutors
when they are making determinations of whether the law's protections
should apply. If prosecutors make decisions to prosecute contingent on
whether or not a jury is more likely to convict the user of force based on
who he or she is, then the law will not be applied equally. Prosecutors
should not give effect to personal or social biases by basing the decision
of whether or not to prosecute a case on who the user of force is rather
than what he or she did. Another factor which plays an integral role in
the law's actual effects is the determination of probable cause by police.
155. See § 776.032.
156. See S.B. 878, 109th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2007) (proposed amendments to FLA. STAT.
§§ 776.013, 776.032).
157. See H.R.B. 371, 109th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2007) (proposed amendments to FLA. STAT.
§§ 776.013, 776.032).
158. See S.B. 878; H.R.B. 371.
159. See S.B. 878; H.R.B. 371.
160. See S.B. 878; H.R.B. 371.
161. Florida Senate, http://www.flsenate.gov/session/index.cfm?BI_Mode=ViewBilllnfo&
Mode=Bills&SubMenu=l&Year=2007&billnum=878 (last visited Sept. 23, 2008).
162. Florida House of Representatives, http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/bills
detail.aspx?Billld=34944&Sessionld=54 (last visited Sept. 23, 2008).
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D. The Determination of Probable Cause by Police
Sergeant Ring's statement describing the difficulty in determining
reasonable fear depicts one of the differences before and after the law
went into effect. Previously, using deadly force in a place other than the
home or workplace without retreating would generally result in charging
the individual using such force with a crime. Now, under section
776.032, the police must look for evidence proving the person did not
have reasonable fear of great bodily harm or death. 163 This evidence
must be used to determine whether the user of force acted reasonably. If
the law enforcement officials cannot establish probable cause that the
force used was unlawful because it was motivated by something other
than reasonable fear, then the police are forbidden from even arresting
the person who used deadly force."64
In order to arrest an individual, law enforcement must have proba-
ble cause to believe that a crime is being or has been committed. 165 In
Seago v. State, the Court stated, "Facts constituting probable cause need
not meet the standard of conclusiveness and probability required to sup-
port a conviction."' 66 Under the "Stand Your Ground" law, law enforce-
ment must decide whether or not the user of force acted with a
reasonable belief under the circumstances. Thus, determining if probable
cause exists requires police to assess the nexus between reasonable fear
and the amount of force used-including deadly force. Because "Stand
Your Ground" does not purport to change the Florida common-law
objective standard for reasonableness when assessing self-defense
claims, 67 law enforcement's determination will turn on whether or not
the user of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.
Thus, under the objective standard, law enforcement is to assess the situ-
ation based on whether an objectively reasonable person would have had
reasonable fear that the alleged attacker was going to kill or do great
bodily harm. Section 776.032(2) says law enforcement agencies are to
make this determination using "standard procedures for investigating the
163. See FLA. STAT. § 776.032(2) (2007).
164. See id.
165. See Stone v. State, 856 So. 2d 1109, 1111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Swartz v. State, 857
So. 2d 950, 951-52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
166. Seago v. State, 768 So. 2d 498, 500 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Swartz, 857 So. 2d at 952
(quoting Seago, 768 So. 2d at 500).
167. See, e.g., Price v. Gray's Guard Serv., Inc., 298 So. 2d 461,464 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)
("The conduct of a person acting in self defense is measured by an objective standard, but the
standard must be applied to the facts and circumstances as they appeared at the time of the
altercation to the one acting in self defense."); Gil v. State, 266 So. 2d 43, 44-45 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1972) ("In order to take advantage of self-defense in a homicide, the situation must be such
as to induce a reasonably prudent person to believe that danger was imminent and that there was a
real necessity for the taking of a life.").
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use of force."' 68
Under section 776.032(2) of the Florida Statutes, law enforcement
is the initial arbiter in deciding whether a person's use of deadly force
was reasonable or excessive. ' 69 Thus, unless prosecutors decide to pur-
sue cases where police initially decline to investigate, law enforcement's
decision about whether the user of force had reasonable fear and used
reasonable force will determine whether or not a case is adjudicated. In
"Stand Your Ground: New Challenges for Forensic Psychologists," an
article by forensic psychologist Patricia Wallace, Wallace states that "it
is important to understand how the law enforcement agency defines and
measures the construct of reasonable fear and correlates it with reasona-
ble force, including deadly force."' 7 ° As illustrated in Part II(c)(ii) by
the varying methods for handling cases by law enforcement, including
the difference in the amount of time spent investigating incidents and
whether or not cases of self-defense are actually reviewed by detectives,
the standard investigation procedures can differ depending on the law
enforcement agency. 7' Wallace explains that although these agencies
are trained to handle crime scenes, determining the reasonableness of the
force used and the existence of reasonable fear goes beyond the deci-
sions that are made during standard investigation procedures.' Wallace
concludes that law enforcement agencies need periodic training pro-
grams and the psychological tools that give these groups the necessary
training for assessing the fear-force constructs and human behavior.
73
In many situations involving the use of deadly force, the only basis
for determining whether the force used was reasonable will be the user
of force's version of the facts, because the receiver of the force died.
Thus, law enforcement's determination of whether probable cause dem-
onstrating that the user of force was unreasonable will often hinge solely
on the claim of the self-interested party. The user of force is most likely
to provide a rendition of facts that would make it seem objectively rea-
sonable that he or she had reasonable fear and that the amount of force
used was reasonable. When combining this scenario with the docu-
tA - ..... methods and alnounts of time spent investigating inci-
dents by law enforcement officials, an analytical approach should
recognize a significant problem. If police rely solely on the user of
force's claim and do not perform a more thorough investigation into
168. § 776.032(2).
169. Id.
170. Patricia Wallace, Stand Your Ground: New Challenges for Forensic Psychologists,
FORENSIC EXAMINER, Fall 2006, at 37.
171. See Curtis, supra note 86.
172. See Wallace, supra note 170, at 39.
173. See id. at 41.
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whether there is other evidence that the force used was unreasonable,
then there is too great an opportunity for injustice. "Standard investigat-
ing procedures" may not be adequate to assess claims of self-defense
when the only obvious leads to determine reasonableness are the self-
interested user of force's claim. Thus, police must be diligent and more
probing when investigating the situations where there does not appear to
be more evidence than the user of force's claim. Where police do not
conduct more thorough investigations in these situations, miscarriages of
justice can occur.
E. Case Law Involving "Stand Your Ground" Defenses
There has been very little judicial interpretation of the "Stand Your
Ground" law since it went into effect, and the judicial interpretation pro-
vided by the courts has focused on whether the law can be applied retro-
actively. The Fourth District Court of Appeals of Florida held that the
law did not apply retroactively to crimes committed prior to the law's
passage."' The Court noted that there was nothing in the legislation
indicating that the legislature intended for the law to apply retroac-
tively. "'75 The Court further reasoned that because section 776.013 sub-
stantively-rather than procedurally or remedially-changed section
776.012,176 it would be a violation of article X, section 9 of the Florida
Constitution 177 for section 776.013 to be applied in this manner. 78 The
Florida Supreme Court upheld the Fourth District Court of Appeals
decision 179 and further held that section 776.013 of the Florida Statutes
does not apply to cases pending at the time the statute became effec-
tive. '8 The Court stated that "[t]he primary effect of section 776.013 is
to specifically incorporate 'no duty to retreat' for certain situations when
deadly force can immediately occur without needing to first retreat."' 8 1
In a footnote addressing the presumptions created by section 776.013,
the Florida Supreme Court noted, "We [the Court] do not here address
or consider the validity of conclusive presumptions."'' 12
The case of Norman Borden presented another question as to the
law's application but ultimately did not produce any significant judicial
174. State v. Smiley, 927 So. 2d 1000, 1001 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
175. Id. at 1003.
176. Id.
177. Article X, section 9 of the Florida Constitution provides that "[r]epeal or amendment of a
criminal statute shall not affect prosecution or punishment for any crime previously committed."
FLA. CONST. art. X, § 9.
178. See Smiley, 927 So. 2d at 1003.
179. Smiley v. State, 966 So. 2d 330, 337 (Fla. 2007).
180. Id. at 332.
181. Id. at 334.
182. Id. at 334 n.3.
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interpretation of the law. The facts of the case, according to Borden,
were as follows: While walking his dogs, Borden was threatened by two
men in a Jeep who were linked to the Latin gang Surenos 13.183 After a
brief verbal altercation, Borden kicked the Jeep and went into his house
to get his gun.' 84 The two men also retreated from the initial confronta-
tion and picked up a third man, who was a documented member of Sure-
nos 13.185 The three men returned in the Jeep and were driving toward
Borden. 186 Borden claimed to fear that they were trying to run him
over.'87 Borden pulled his gun and shot five times through the wind-
shield.'88 He then moved to the side of the vehicle and fired nine more
rounds.'89 In the end, two of the three men in the car were killed and one
was wounded.' 9 ° The man who survived admitted to investigators that
Borden may have thought he and his friends were trying to hit him with
the Jeep.' 9' He also testified at trial that they were planning to "rough
[Borden] up a little bit." 192
Norman Borden was charged and put on trial for two counts of
murder and one count of attempted murder.193 Prosecutor Craig Wil-
liams admitted that the first round of shots were in self-defense and were
not at issue. 9 Williams said that the only issue for the jurors to decide
was whether the threat faced by Borden was still imminent before he
fired the second round of shots. 95 Williams argued that Borden
exceeded his right to use self-defense after firing the first five shots
because the Jeep had stopped and the threat had dissipated. 196 Borden
claimed that the second round of shots was in self-defense because he
continued to fear for his life. 197
Borden's attorney made a motion to throw out the case based on the
"Stand Your Ground" law. 198 The trial judge denied the motion and
183. See Nancy L. Oth6n, Files Released in Double Killing, FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 19,
2007, at LB.
184. See id.
185. Nancy L. Oth6n, Trial Begins in Deaths of 2 Men, FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, June 21, 2007, at
lB.
186. See oth6n, supra note 183.
187. Nancy L. Oth6n, Dismissing Charges Weighed, FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 12, 2007, at 9B.
188. See Oth6n, supra note 185.
189. See id.
190. See, e.g., Oth6n, supra note 183.
191. See Oth6n, supra note 187.
192. See Oth6n, supra note 185.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See Oth6n, supra note 183.
198. See Oth6n, supra note 185.
2008]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
allowed the case to go to the jury.' 9 9 The jury then acquitted Borden of
all charges."° Prosecutor Craig Williams said that he was almost
relieved when Borden was acquitted because he had privately believed
that Borden was justified under the circumstances. 20 1 He charged Bor-
den, however, because he felt that a jury needed to decide the case. 2
After Borden's acquittal by the jury, Prosecutor Williams was not sur-
prised by the verdict and stated that the three men "were bringing a lot
of violence to [Borden]. It's tough to put yourself in that guy's shoes and
say he didn't act appropriately. It's really tough. 2 03 After the trial, both
Prosecutor Williams and Borden's attorney, Public Defender Carey
Haughwout, agreed that the "Stand Your Ground" law was not even a
factor in the verdict2 °4 and that Borden's case would not likely have
future effect on defendants claiming self-defense under the law.205
The Borden case would have more significance if the judge had
thrown the case out based solely on the "Stand Your Ground" law. The
denial of the motion to dismiss only shows that judicial discretion has
not been changed by the law, which ultimately is of little importance if
most cases never reach a judge in the first place.
Likewise, when James Behanna was put on trial for manslaughter,
which Behanna claimed was in self-defense, the trial court judge
rejected the defense counsel's motion to dismiss based solely on the
"Stand Your Ground" law.206 The judge also denied the defense's
motion for a judgment of acquittal after the State rested its case and at
the conclusion of all evidence because of conflicting testimony and
allowed the case to go to the jury. 2 7 Behanna was ultimately convicted
of manslaughter by a jury and sentenced to fifteen years in prison and
five years of probation.20 8
199. See id.
200. See Nancy L. Oth6n, Borden Not Guilty, FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, June 26, 2007, at 2A.
201. Can Self-Defense Laws Stand Their Ground? New Statutes Like Oklahoma's Cause
Confusion in Other States, OKLAHOMAN (Oklahoma City), July 10, 2007, at IA.
202. See id.
203. Oth6n, supra note 185.
204. See id.
205. See Larry Keller, Jury Acquits Shooter in Castle Doctrine Case, PALM BEACH POST, June
26, 2007, at IA.
206. See Anthony McCartney, Paralegal Charged in Fatal Stabbing, TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 17,
2006, at 6; see also Colleen Jenkins, Jury Says Paralegal Guilty in Stabbing, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Oct. 27, 2006, at lB.
207. See Behanna v. State, 985 So. 2d 550, 554 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
208. See id.; see also Colleen Jenkins, "Nobody Wins" as Sentence Is in Middle, ST.
PETERSBURG TiMmS, Dec. 5, 2006, at lB. On appeal, however, the Florida Second District Court of
Appeals reversed Behanna's conviction and remanded for a new trial because the trial court
"erroneously excluded evidence that would have supported Behanna's self-defense defense." See
Behanna, 985 So. 2d at 551.
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Under a cursory analysis, the rejection by the judges to dismiss the
cases based solely on the "Stand Your Ground" law demonstrates that
the law is functioning properly in the courts by still allowing juries to
decide whether or not a person was acting in self-defense. A critical
analysis, however, reveals that the cases of Borden and Behanna do not
provide insight into one of the most important functions of the law: The
initial decision whether to charge and prosecute an individual. The epi-
sodes where no charges are brought against the user of force based on
the law, such as the Galas/Labiento, Rasmussen/Frazzini, and Allen/
Rosenbloom incidents, show how the law actually works in practice.
The law's real impact can be seen in the incidents which never reach the
courtroom. The incidents where individuals are not charged support the
idea that the law may be acting as a bar to prosecution, as the initial
determinations to charge and prosecute or not will ultimately determine
whether an individual claiming self-defense will face legal conse-
quences. In addition to the lack of judicial interpretation that fails to
provide substantial insight into the law's impact, there are concerns with
the legislature's intent and rationale for passing the "Stand Your
Ground" law.
F. Problems with the Legislature's Rationale for Passing
the Protection of Persons Bill
When looking at the law's actual effects, the legislature's rationale
for the law appears problematic. In the purported reasoning for passing
the law, the legislature stated that the law was passed in order to give
"law-abiding people" the right to protect their family and themselves
from intruders and attackers without having to worry about criminal or
civil penalties before taking action in defense of themselves and
others.209 But some of the individuals who might be able to claim the
protections of the law do not appear to be the types of "law-abiding"
individuals the legislature sought to protect. Jacqueline Galas was a
prostitute who shot her customer Frank Labiento. 21° Both of the shooters
in the gunfight that killed Sherdavia Jenkins had extensive criminal
records.21 1 Future incidents may further illustrate that the law can shield
people who do not abide by the law. Ultimately, the individuals that can
be protected by the "Stand Your Ground" law may not be the "law-
abiding citizens" that the legislature claimed the law was intended to
protect.
As written, the law also seems to be intended to protect individuals
209. See 2005 Fla. Laws 199, 202.
210. See Sommer, supra note 107.
211. See Grimm, supra note 18.
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who are subject to random violence. Some of the reported cases, how-
ever, show that the law is protecting individuals from violence by
acquaintances when the acquaintances' disputes escalate. Frank
Labiento was a long-time customer of Jacqueline Galas; Jason Rosen-
bloom was Kenneth Allen's neighbor; and Michael Frazzini's mother
was Todd Rasmussen's neighbor, and Rasmussen knew Frazzini. These
incidents involved disputes in which both parties were at least relatively
well-known to each other. Such examples are far from the random vio-
lence that the law appears to be intending to protect against. If protection
from random violence is what the law is actually intended to protect,
then, arguably, the analysis should change when the victim and user of
self-defense are acquaintances. One solution would be to deem incidents
involving acquaintances as per se unreasonable unless the user of self-
defense can prove that a weapon or an explicit threat with the means to
achieve it were present. The opposite approach would be for the legisla-
ture to state that this law was intended to protect individuals regardless
of whether or not they were acquainted with the victim. Based on the
legislature's purported rationale, however, acquaintances claiming the
law's protections appear to be another instance where the law may be
used to protect individuals that the Florida Legislature did not intend.
Furthermore, is the law aimed at permitting and condoning the use
of firearms for people to protect themselves? By specifically including
the statement that people have the right to bear arms in defense of them-
selves under the State Constitution, 2 ' the legislature seems to be saying
just that. The heavy influence and publicity by the NRA should indicate
that the group has its own self-interest in the law. Regardless of the
NRA's input and promotion, including the statement regarding the right
to bear arms in the rationale for passing the law makes the law appear to
be directed toward sanctioning the use of firearms. This raises serious
questions: What is the real purpose behind including the statement about
the right to bear arms under the Florida Constitution? What message is
the legislature sending to the citizens of Florida? Is the legislature
encouraging the use of firearms when a person acts in self-defense? And
if so, should it be?
III. RECOMMENDATIONS: THE NEED FOR
CHANGE AND CLARIFICATION
There are a variety of steps that the Florida Legislature should take
that would clarify and provide insight into how the law functions in
practice. As an administrative matter, the legislature should mandate the
212. See 2005 Fla. Laws 202.
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creation of a system to track self-defense claims so that people can see
the actual effects of the law. Also, the Florida Legislature should make
amendments to clarify the "Stand Your Ground" law. Such amendments
would significantly aid police, prosecutors, and the general public in
understanding how and when the law applies. I recommend three
amendments. First, the legislature should amend section 776.013(1) so
that the presumptions of a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm
and of an intruder's malicious intent are rebuttable. Second, the legisla-
ture should specifically state the amount of force that can be used when
a person acts in self-defense. Third, "unlawful activity" should be
defined or, on the other hand, stricken entirely from section 776.013(3),
so that it is clear what the provision means, how it is applicable, and
when the immunity granted in section 776.032 applies. While none of
these recommendations is perfect, these amendments, if made, can sub-
stantially clarify some of the problems that plague the current law.
A. Create a System to Track and Document Self-Defense Claims
As an administrative matter, the Florida Legislature should require
that claims of self-defense and the outcomes of the cases are tracked and
documented by prosecutors and law enforcement. This would enable all
Floridians to see the actual effects of the law and understand how the
law functions in practice.
Law enforcement should track how cases are investigated and the
methods by which they investigate. This would provide insight into what
law enforcement's normal investigating procedures are and which cases
receive more or less attention than others. Prosecutors also need to docu-
ment the incidents that they decide not to prosecute and the incidents in
which defendants are given plea deals. Furthermore, prosecutors should
document the outcomes of the cases that are prosecuted to provide statis-
tics on the effectiveness of defendants using the law as a defense. Taken
together, the effect of a system to track and document incidents involv-
ing claims under the "Stand Your Ground" law would provide important
statistics which can be used to determine the law's actual effects inside
and outside the courtroom.
B. Eliminate the Presumptions of a Reasonable Fear of Death or
Great Bodily Harm and of an Intruder's Malicious
Intent Under Section 776.013 or Make
the Presumptions Rebuttable
The legislature should either eliminate the presumptions of reasona-
ble fear and of an intruder's malicious intent or should at least make the
presumptions rebuttable with other evidence. The conclusive presump-
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tions essentially make it so that a person can use deadly force to protect
his or her "castle" so long as there is an unlawful and forcible entry by
another and the user of force believed such was occurring. The user of
force is justified in using deadly force even if the facts can prove that the
user of force did not have reasonable fear or that using deadly force was
excessive. If an individual can act with complete impunity whenever he
can prove that another was unlawfully entering or attempting to enter
and that the individual believed such intrusion to be occurring, then it
ultimately makes it safer for individuals to act without thinking and
encourages a "shoot first" mentality. Although the new law does not
appear to provide the same heightened degree with regards to the sanc-
tity of life as the common law, the law should not do away with the
possibility that the intruder's intent was not malicious and that the user
of force did not have a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm.
The cases where there would be sufficient evidence to prove that
the user of force did not have reasonable fear or that the intruder had no
malicious intent are likely to be few. But where there is such evidence,
then it should be able to be considered by a jury when determining if the
use and amount of force was justified under the circumstances. Unless
the presumptions are eliminated or made rebuttable, then there is too
great a chance that miscarriages of justice will occur.
Furthermore, removing the presumptions or at least making them
rebuttable would send the message that individuals must act reasonably
in all situations, and these changes would deter injustice from occurring
in situations where the user of deadly force did not have a reasonable
fear or that the user of force knew or reasonably believed the intruder
had no malicious intent. The old adage that with great power comes
great responsibility is apt: The power to take another human life should
always be tempered with the responsibility that a person have a reasona-
ble belief of death or great bodily harm and that the amount of force
used was reasonable. While the presumptions exist and are irrebuttable,
this great power is not properly accompanied by great responsibility.
C. Define the Amount of Force Which Can Be Used
The permissible amount of force which can be used in situations
must be clearly defined. The law should explain that the amount of force
used in response to the force with which the person was being threatened
must be roughly equivalent to the force or threat. This clarification
would remove some of the remaining doubt as to when deadly force-
most importantly the use of firearms-is permissible. Because the law
states that a person can meet "force with force," it leaves too much room
for interpretation as to the amount of force that the law allows under the
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circumstances. As Representative Kottkamp said, the law's intent is that
a person can only use force that is commensurate with the force used
against him or her.21 3 In the Frazzini incident, Frazzini was carrying a
fourteen-inch toy bat at the time when he was confronted by Corey Ras-
mussen, who pulled a knife. Then Todd Rasmussen shot Frazzini, claim-
ing he feared for his son's life. 214 There is an inherent injustice when
someone carrying a novelty bat is killed while facing two adult men, one
wielding a knife and the other a firearm. Whether the situation merited
the use of deadly force is highly questionable.21 5
Some individuals, who have lost a friend or family member when
another person has stood his or her ground, have expressed their views
on what the law requires from a person standing his or her ground and
how the law applies. Jason Rosenbloom's mother, Doreen, made the
statement following the shooting of her son by his neighbor that "[t]his
law is pretty scary .... All you have to do is say you feel threatened,
and you can shoot someone and get away with it."216.A friend of Justin
Boyette, Eric Wagner, spoke of his interpretation of the law after Boy-
ette was shot and killed by Michael Brady, who was cleared of all
charges by a grand jury.217 Wagner stated, "A lot of people are going to
die as soon as people figure out this law .... All you have to say is, 'I
was afraid,' and you can blow someone away. '"218 David Jenkins, the
father of Sherdavia Jenkins, the little girl who was gunned down by a
stray bullet from a gunfight between two men, stated, "Children and
innocent people shouldn't have to live in fear of someone saying, 'I
don't like the way you look at me. Bam! You're dead.' ,21
9
Even if these individual interpretations of the law are contrary to
the legislature's intent, the statute, as written, is unclear as to the amount
of force which can be used. If other members interpret the law similarly,
and their interpretations are against the legislature's intent, then the leg-
islature must take the initiative to clarify what the law means so as to
provide notice to all citizens. As a matter of policy, a law which can
potentially be used to justify taking another person's life in certain situa-
tions needs to specifically define the amount of force that can be used in
those situations. Without such clarification, it confuses law enforcement,
213. See Ogles, supra note 128.
214. See id.
215. See Cook, supra note 131; Ogles, supra note 128.
216. Grimm, supra note 18.
217. Curtis, supra note 86.
218. See id.
219. Madeline Bar6 Diaz, Parents of Slain Girl Take on Shooting Law, FLA. SUN-SETINEL,
Dec. 10, 2006, at 7B.
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prosecutors, and the public as to when the law applies, and innocent
lives may be unjustly lost.
D. Limit Law Enforcement and Prosecutor's Discretion in
Determining What Constitutes "Unlawful Activity"
Section 776.013(3) requires that an individual cannot be involved
in an "unlawful activity" in order to be able to use deadly force in a
place where they legally have a right to be.220 A crux of this require-
ment, "unlawful activity," allows for too much discretion to law enforce-
ment and prosecutors. The law fails to provide standards which dictate
the precise time-framing and degree of unlawful activity which cause the
law's protections to be inapplicable. Without such guidance, law
enforcement and prosecutors are given too much discretion in determin-
ing when the provision is applicable.
Despite the prosecutor's claim that the case was "very clear" under
the law,221 the Galas and Labiento incident illustrates how important the
"unlawful activity" element could be in determining whether an individ-
ual is prosecuted. If a person is carrying a gun illegally, but otherwise
meets the requirements of section 776.013(3), is he or she entitled to the
protection of the statutes, including immunity from all civil and criminal
prosecution? Also, are the law's protections not applicable only when a
person is engaging in the "unlawful activity" during the exact time that
he or she uses deadly force? Or is the totality of the circumstances to be
taken into account, including the capacity in which the person is acting,
such as Galas being at Labiento's home for purposes of prostitution or a
drug dealer at someone's home for the purposes of selling drugs?
Situations such as those described above are not clear under section
776.013(3). The carrying of a gun illegally can be especially vexing
because of the policy choices associated with it. On one hand, a person
should be able to protect him or herself by using deadly force if faced
with an assailant intent on killing or doing severe bodily harm to him or
her. On the other hand, society should not condone individuals carrying
firearms without having gone through the proper safeguards such as
obtaining licenses and permits for the weapons.
The allocation of excessive discretion to law enforcement and pros-
ecutors in determining when the "unlawful activity" provision is appli-
cable can be remedied in two different ways. First, the legislature can
define "unlawful activity" and explain the extent to which the provision
applies, including the precise time-framing and degree of unlawful activ-
ity that will exempt an individual using force from the claiming the
220. See FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2007).
221. See Sommer, supra note 107.
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law's benefits. This would be valuable in providing law enforcement,
prosecutors, and the public with a definition as to what constitutes
"unlawful activity" and whether an individual can claim the law's pro-
tections. If the legislature were to provide such a definition, it must also
clarify whether this provision applies to individuals who are engaged in
the unlawful activity at the specific time that self-defense is used or
whether it applies to individuals who are involved in unlawful activity-
such as acting in his or her capacity as a prostitute or drug dealer-but
are not conducting such activity at the specific time that self-defense
was used. Alternatively, the "unlawful activity" requirement can be
stricken from the law entirely. This method would make the law's pro-
tections available to all individuals, regardless of whether or not they are
engaged in unlawful activity at the time of using force in self-defense.
The downside to this method, however, is that the law would no longer
jive with the legislature's intent to protect "law-abiding citizens"-even
though it is questionable as to whether the law's application will satisfy
this intention-because the law would also shield the individuals who
did not abide by the law. Either of these solutions would clarify this
ambiguous provision and provide the police and public with guidance
for when a person using deadly force can claim section 776.013(3) as a
defense.
CONCLUSION
More than three years after the law was enacted it remains difficult
to determine the actual effects and implications of the law on Florida's
citizens, law enforcement, and legal community. As of now, both the
proponents and opponents of the "Stand Your Ground" law can produce
support for their arguments. For the law's advocates, prosecutors' state-
ments that homicides cannot be attributed to the law show that the law is
working well and that it has not turned Florida into the Wild West, as
many of the people who opposed the law predicted. But on the other
hand, pc o ponents of the law view tc eonfusion and disparity in
the law's application as verifying the belief that the law is ill-conceived
and can result in questionable outcomes. Furthermore, the cases where
individuals are not charged or are given generous plea deals in part
because of the law vindicate the opponents. However, the supporters of
the law can respond by saying that there are relatively few cases which
implicate the law since its enactment, thus a few atypical results are just
another part of the American legal system. Ultimately, the actual effects
of the "Stand Your Ground" law may be difficult to document, but these
effects are nevertheless real and have an impact on prosecutors, law
enforcement, and society.
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Despite whether one agrees or disagrees with the law, it is here to
stay. It governs the citizens of Florida, and thus these citizens must have
notice of their rights under the law and knowledge of when it does and
does not apply. Furthermore, prosecutors and law enforcement groups
also need to understand the law's applicability, and these groups must
have clear standards for enforcing the law.
If the legislature takes the initiative to amend the law, it will aid all
Floridians regardless of whether they belong to groups that enforce the
law or are civilians who are required to abide by it. If the law is actually
working as a bar to prosecution more so than a defense, then the legisla-
ture should be obligated to make changes so that the law functions in a
manner that will be least likely to cause injustice. Amendments to clarify
the law will serve to provide notice to citizens of when the law applies
and a more concrete framework for law enforcement and prosecutors to
use in applying the law to individuals claiming self-defense. Eliminating
the presumptions in section 776.013 or making them rebuttable with
other evidence, explicitly stating the amount of force that can be used in
particular circumstances, and limiting prosecutors' and law enforce-
ment's discretion by defining unlawful activity are steps which will
facilitate this process. Based on the legislature's history of refusing to
amend or further define the law, however, it may not be a "reasonable
belief' to think this will occur.
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